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l. Background. 
For many years. at least since McCarthy and Hayes ( 1969 ). writers 
have lamented, and attempted to compensate for, the alleged fact that we 
often do not have adequate statistical knowledge for governing the 
uncertainty of belief, for making uncertain inferences, and the like. It is 
hardly ever spelled out what "adequate statistical knowledge" would be, if 
we had it, and �adequate statistical knowledge could be used to control 
and regulate epistemic uncert.ainty. 
One response to the lack of adequate statistics has been to search 
for non-statistical measures of uncertainty. The minimal variant has been 
to propose "subjective probability" as a concept to which we can turn when 
we lack statistics. 
This proposal comes ,in widely differing flavors. corresponding to 
the dreadful ambiguity of "subjective". Sometimes this means 
merely "indexed by a subject". In this sense there is no conflict with 
statistical representations: the "subjectivity" involved just represents the 
fact that statistical knowledge is related to (had by) a knower. (This 
appears to be the sense of "subjective"· employed by Cheeseman· ( 1987).) 
At the other extreme, "subjective" may mean a(bitrary, subject to 
no objective control or constraint. Those who think we must turn in this 
direction are influenced by the feeling that in many cases there may be 
nothing better to turn to. The philosopher F. P. Ramsey, who did much to 
make the subjective approach to uncertainty respectable, wrote: " ... a man's 
expectation of drawing a white or a black ball from an urn ... may within 
the limits of consistency be any he likes ... " ( 1931. p. 189 ). 
Other proposals concern non-probabilistic measures of uncertainty� 
the certainty factors of MYCIN ( 1984), the belief functions of Shafer ( 1987), 
the fuzzy membership relation of Zadeh ( 1986). 
Our purpose here is not to evaluate these alternative treatments of 
uncertainty, but rather to explore the question of how far you can go on 
the basis of statistical knowledge that you Q2 have, and what 
considerations must be taken account of in this attempt. Relatively few 
people have explored the question of how far you can go using statistical 
knowledge.1 
A second question, in fact the one that McCarthy and Hayes had in 
mind, is the question of using statistical knowledge to provide an 
·underpinning for uncertain inference -- that is, inference that is based on 
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·incomplete knowledge. A basic presupposition of the non-monotonic and 
default industries seems to be that you cannot very often base such 
inferences on statistical knowledge. In part this presupposition is based on 
the feeling that "typicality" and "frequency'' mean different things. Be that 
as it may, in formalizing non-monotonic logics many people seem to be led 
to considerations that (not surprisingly!) mirror considerations appropriate 
to the �pplication of statistical knowledge. 
Thus Etherington ( 1987) introduces the concept of preference 
among models; Konolige ( 1987) defines a notion of minimal extension; 
Touretzky (1986) gives a metric for inferential distance. 
These ideas will be reflected in the principles governing the 
relvance of statistical knowledge to be discussed below. Our analysis of the 
ground-rules for the use of statistical knowledge will throw light on the 
"cancellation principles" of non-monotonic logic as well. 
2. Assumptions. 
The assumptions we make here are four. · 
( 1} We suppose that the knowledge base may have objective statistical 
knowledge in it. This statistical knowledge may be construed in a number 
of ways -- for example as statements concerning chances or statements 
concerning frequencies in an arbitrarily long run. or statements concerning 
frequencies summed over possible worlds. We do suppose that these 
statements are general: that is that they do not represent the fact that we 
have recorded a frequency in a specific sample. We ·.mu have done so, and 
gone on to infer a general statistical statement. But we also may have 
gotten our statistical knowledge from a handbook, or a dependable 
colleague. In any event, the statistical knowledge in our knowledge base is 
taken to be general scientific knowledge relating properties; we will write 
"�(A,.K) • p" to represent the fact that the long-run frequency A's among 
.R's is .a1 We will weaken this assumption later to take account of 
approximate statistical knowledge. The long run frequency of A 's may be 
about p, or at least q. 
(2) We assume that our body of knowledge-- our background 
knowledge -- determines equivalence classes of the statements whose 
uncertainty concerns us. Sand Tare in the same equivalence class if we 
know that they have the same truth values: that is, if and only if the truth 
functional biconditional S 0 Tis part of our knowledge. Thus if we know 
that the next toss of this coin is the next toss of a 1979 U.S. quarter and 
that it lands heads if and only if it fails to land tails, and that I will choose 
to have chocolate ice cream if and only if it lands tails, then 
"The next toss of this coin lands heads" 
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"The next toss of a 1979 U.S. quarter lands heads" 
"The next toss of this coin does not land tails" 
"I will not choose chocolate ice cream" 
all fall in the same equivalence class and have the same probability. 
The guestion to which we take statisical knowledge to be relevant 
is the whole equivalence �lass of statements. It is this assumption that 
ensures that we always have statistical knowledge that bears (relevantly) 
on any given statement, however unique2 the subject of that statement. It 
is also tl;tis assumption that requires us to think about the princioples of 
statistical relevance: if "5' D r· is in our know lege base, then the same 
statistical knowledge that is relevant to Smust also be relevant to T. 
(3) We assume. as usual. that our knowledge base can be expressed in 
a first order extensional language. 3 We may still take an individual to be 
arbitrarily complex: for example it might be a trial of a complicated 
compound experiment -- say an ordered triple consisting of a room in a 
house. an urn in the room, and a ball in the urn. 
( 4) Finally, in order for statistics to be of interest, we must suppose 
that we may know some things about an individual without knowing 
everything about it. Thus we might know of "the next trial" that it is a trial 
consisting of selecting one of a number of urns at random, and then 
selecting a coin at random from the urn, and then tossing the coin 1 0 times. 
And then we might be interested in whether the tenth toss landed heads 
on that trial. or we might know the number of heads among the tosses, and 
we might be interested in whether the urn was urn number 4. or we might 
be interested in knowing something about the frequency of two headed 
coins in the urn from which we got our sample. 
3. Interference I. 
We will be concerned with the way in which some items of 
statistical knowledge can interfere with the epistemic relevance of other 
items. 
If all we know of Tweety is that she is a bird. it is reasonable to 
believe that she can fly. If we also know that she is a penguin, then it is 
reasonable to believe that she cannot fly, since our knowledge about the 
chances of a penguin flying interferes with our knowledge about the 
chances of a bird flying. If (as we may in our biological ignorance 
suppose) there is a rare kind of penguin that .em fly, and if we know that 
Tweety is one of them. then this new knowledge interferes with our 
general knowledge about penguins, and again we may suppose tha·t Tweety 
gnfly. 
This relation has been noted by Etherington, Poole, Konolige, and 
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others. It corresponds to what Reichenbach ( 1949) had in mind when he 
said that we should base our "posits" (degrees of belief) on the "narrowest" 
reference class concerning which we have adequate statistics. 
A principle embodyip.g this natural constraint must be stated \'s.rith 
somewhat more generality than is at first obvious, however. 
Suppose (to move to an artificial example) we know of ball# 18 
that it is a ball in certain room, and that we know that fifty percent of the 
· balls in that room are black. Suppose we know also that that particular 
ball is also one in an urn. urn A, in which 80% are black. The second piece 
of statistical knowledge is clearly epistemically relevant and the first is not.. 
This intuition is based on the fact that the set of balls in the urn in the 
room is a subset of the set of balls in the room. 
But maybe we want to know whether the nezt ball to be chosen 
lrom the room is black. Under the usual conditions of such hypothetical 
experiments, we are entitled to infer that 50% of the choosings of balls are 
choosings of black balls. So we may consider the frequency �ith which 
such choosings are choosings of black balls. 
This should be irrelevant since we know that # 18 came from· an 
urn in which 80% of the balls are black. But the set of balls in that urn isn't 
a set of choosings at all and so not a subset of the set of objects we are now 
considering. The subset principle is of no direct help to us. Nor should it 
be, for it is certainly ir;ttelligible to suppose that while the frequency of 
black choosings corresponds to the proportion of black balls in general. it 
fails to do so in the set of choosings ·from urn A. If this is not the case -- if 
we have reason to believe that 80% of the choosings from urn A yield a 
black ball -- then either structure should be acceptable, despite the fact 
that one concerns. choosings (events) and the other balls(objects). 
We � stipulate that all the sentences in question have some 
specific canonical logical form: but we shall see shortly that that is not such 
a good idea. What we can do instead is to formula�e our principle a bit 
more broadly: 
The Subset Principle: Suppose that "a is a B" is in our knowledge base, and 
that"%( C:B) • p" is in our knowledge base. Suppose that we know that a· 
is a C if and only if ais a C. The statistical knowledge that a' is a B', and 
that%( C,B') • p', where pOp', is epistemical1}7irrelevantif we know of 
a subset of B', B", such that we know both a' is .a B" and %( C,B") - p. 
The subset principle is one that has been frequently identified in 
the context ofnon-monotonic logic. 
4. Mutual Interference. 
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The subset principle does not always help, as the Nixon Diamond 
indicates. (Again we see a relation between the application of statistics and 
non-monotonic logic.) Suppose person#. 18 is known to be a quaker, and 
that we know that 90% of quakers are pacifists; and also that person # 18 
is a republican, and that 20% of republicans are pacifists. It seems clear 
that neither the 20% nor the 90% are the relevant frequencies. If we knew 
the proportion of pacifists among republican quakers, we could usefully 
apply the subset principle, but we.have no reason to suppose that we know 
this proportion (which. of·course, may have any value from 0 to 1 ). If we 
allow vague statistical knowledge, we will have knowledge about the 
iptersection, but it might be only that the proportion of pacifists is 
somewhere between 0% and 100%. 
It is not entirely unreasonable that conflicting information can 
leave us in a state of ignorance. But sometimes we feel that we can do 
bettter. There are a number of ways in which we gn do better, though no 
completely general procedure seems credible. 
5. Interference II. 
Here is an example that calls for a second P.rinciple: As before. 
suppose we have a roomful of urns, and that # �8 designates a ball in the 
room. Suppose we know that there are 100 balls fu the room, and that SO 
are black. But suppose we also know that there are 10 urns, that 9 of them 
containing four black balls and one white ball, and that the tenth contains 
the remainder of the balls. The relative frequency of black balls in the 
first nine urns is .80
, 
and the relative frequency of black balls in the tenth 
urn is 14155 • .25 ... 
Let us consider what statistics are relevant to the statement, "# 18 
is black." If we know of# 18 only that it is a ball in the room, it is only the 
statistics about the frequency of black balls in the room that are relevant. 
If we know �something about how# 18 came to be the designated ball. 
the other statistics may also be relevant. For example, we might know that 
# 18 is the ball resulting from first ·choosing an urn at random, and then 
choosing a ball at random from the chosen urn. If that is the case, the 
relevant statistics are those governing the proportion of pairs consisting of 
an urn, and a ball drawn from tha� urn, such that the second member of 
the pair is black. We can easily calculate the proportion of pairs having 
this property to be .9 * .8 + .1 * .25 ... •·. 745 ... 
But why, under these circumstances, should we regard the general 
statistics concerning balls in the room to be epistemically irrelevant? The 
interfering set isn't a subset of its competitor. (Note that .745 ... cannot. 
-mathematically, be the relative frequency in any subset of the set of balls 
in the room!) 
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But we can find a relationship: there is a possible reference class 
that matches the competitor, of which the correct reference set is. a subset 
-- namely, the cross product of the set of urns and the set of balls. This 
construction is particularly important in the context of (so-called) Bayesian 
inference; the model we just looked at corresponds to a non-sampling ca5e 
in which we have a prior probability of .9 combined with a conditional 
probability of .8, and a prior probability of . 1  combined with a conditional 
probability of .25 ... We therefore call the rule the Bayesian Principle: 
The Bayesian Principle: Suppose that " (a,b . . ) is a B'' is in our knowledge 
base, and that "%( c;B) - p" is in our knowl�dge base. The statistical 
knowledge that a' is a C' if and only if ais a G"'that a' is a B', and that �( C 
',B')- p' 0 p is epistemicaJJr irrelevantif we know of a cross product of B 
·with B" and a corresponding subset C' and a" such that 
( 1) <a',a"> is known to be in B' ¢ B", 
(2) <a',���·> is in C' if and only if a is in C, 
(3) �( C', B' ¢ B") =- p', 
and for some B* known to be a subset of B' ¢ B", 
(4} %(B*,C}- p. 
The Bayesian principle is followed in constructing representations 
of uncertainty in which uncertainties are ·modified by new evidence, but I 
have not noticed it in discussions of non-monotonic inference. It should be, 
of course. 
Al.most all (species of) .mammals give birth to their young live .. 
Given an arbitrary individual mammal. we do not have reason to think it 
give.s birth to its young live, since half of mammals don't give birth at all. 
(The analogous point with respect to birds was pointed out by Nutter 
( 1987).) Given an arbitrary individual female mammal. we have reason to 
think it will give birth to its young live, since almost all species of 
mammals are such that when their females reproduce, they do it that way. 
(Almost all the reproductive ba1ls in almost all the urns are white, though 
it is not th� case that almost all the balls in an urn are reproductive .  ) We 
accommodate the ovoviviparous platypus by noting that its species (its 
urn} is unusual. 
6. Interference III. · 
The final principle of relevance we need for dealing with statistical 
knowledge is in a sense the dual of our first principle, the subset principle. 
Suppose that we are_ sampling from a population Cwith a view to making 
an inference about the propprtion of B's there are' in C It is a gen�ral set 
theoretical fact that almost all subsets of a given set reflect within narrow 
limits the comp<;>sition of the parent set. It is consistent with this 
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observation that we should have observed more. Cs than we mentioned 
explicitly. This should render the previous numbers irrelevant. The larger 
sample is the one that is epistemically relevant. A principle that captures 
this intuition is: 
The Supersample Principle:· Suppose that we know ·�hat an is a member of 
p7and that we are interested in the chance that an is /?a. The statist.ical 
knowledge that am is known to be a member of Jft1. that a Ill is a It if and 
only if anis �r0. and that�( Ira,p7) =p D p'= OJ.(Ir'..l;/11) is epJ:ftem!c:zllJ' 
irrelevant if we also know that" a 01is a subset of an. 
7. Discussion. 
It is my belief that �he�e three principles are a� the principles we 
need to detetmine the epistemic relevance of statistical knowledge in the 
case in which we either have exact knowledge �r none at all. It may be that 
other principles are needed, but I have seen no examples that intuitively 
require additional principles. 
· 
Should they be called ''principles?" It seems to me that they 
·should, and that they are all roughly on a par, even though the subset 
principles is derivable from the Bayesian principle. They may be 
construed collectively as an articulation 
of our intuitive ideas about "total evidence." 
The first principle directs us to use· the most specific evidence at 
hand. The second directs us to take account of general.background 
knowledge. The third says not to ignore available data. Stated thus they 
seem sensible enough. 
8. Inexact K.nowledge. 
' By providing a new characterization of "difference" among 
statistical statements, we can easily generalize the above considerations. 
Let "%(A, B) E [p, q ]" diJJ"er from "OJ.( , .. .0) € [r.s ]" just in case neither of [p, q 1 
nor [r,.f] is included in the other. Let us say that the former is stronger 
than the latter if [p,q} C [r.s]. Then we shall say that one item of statistical 
knowledge is irrelevant to another if 
(.a) it differs, but is rendered irrelevant by one of the three 
principles expounded above, or 
(b) it is weaker than the other and no third item of statistical 
knowledge renders it irrelevant. 
8. Conclusions: 
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( 1) If we accept the equivalence condition -- that statements 
connnected in our knowledge base by a biconditional should have the same 
probability -- then many more statements than might at first have been 
thought can have probabilities based on statistical background knowledge. 
( 2) There are three intuitive ways in which conflict between two 
potential reference classes can be resolved to the benefit of one of them. 
(3) These three-resolutions reflect the three principles: the Subset 
Principle, the Bayesian Principle, and the Superset Princiole. 
( 4) The results of this analysis can be used to implement 
probabilistic non-monotonic acceptance as well as to deter mint: rationally . 
allowable distributions of unCertainty. 
*' Research underlying this paper has been partially supported by the Signals 
Warfare Center of the U.S. Ar.my. 
1. One writer who has taken this question seriously is Bacchus (1988). 
2. "however unique": This way oftallting is offensive to anyone with grammatical 
sensipilities, but so it goes. 
3. Of course this requires enough arithmetic, in first order form. to accommodate the 
statistics! 
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